> SSH has a security issue. Discovered in February, 2001 by security
> analyst Michal Zalewski, the SSH CRC-32 bug is a very real buffer
> overflow in a chunk of code designed to guard against cryptographic
> attacks on SSH version one. Properly exploited, it grants full remote
> access to the vulnerable machine.
>
> "I think there are at least two public exploits in circulation right
> now," said Zalewski, in a telephone interview. "They just got released
> about a month after the advisory. And I know there are some that are not
> public."
This issue has long ago been fixed in all the implementations of SSH about
which I know. Additionally, most servers use SSH 2 now.
> The actual program Trinity uses is fictitious -- there no "sshnuke,"
> yet, and genuine exploits sensibly drop the user directly into a root
> shell, while the big screen version forces the hacker to change the
> system's root password -- in this case to "Z1ON1010.".
I'd guess, if we were discussing real life, that `sshnuke` was a script
they wrote.
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